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Objectives: Face-to-face healthcare, including psychiatric provision, must continue
despite reduced interpersonal contact during the COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus)
pandemic. Community-based services might use domiciliary visits, consultations in
healthcare settings, or remote consultations. Services might also alter direct contact
between clinicians. We examined the effects of appointment types and clinician–clinician
encounters upon infection rates.
Design: Computer simulation.
Methods: We modelled a COVID-19-like disease in a hypothetical community
healthcare team, their patients, and patients’ household contacts (family). In one
condition, clinicians met patients and briefly met family (e.g., home visit or collateral
history). In another, patients attended alone (e.g., clinic visit), segregated from each
other. In another, face-to-face contact was eliminated (e.g., videoconferencing). We also
varied clinician–clinician contact; baseline and ongoing “external” infection rates; whether
overt symptoms reduced transmission risk behaviourally (e.g., via personal protective
equipment, PPE); and household clustering.
Results: Service organisation had minimal effects on whole-population
infection under our assumptions but materially affected clinician infection.
Appointment type and inter-clinician contact had greater effects at low
external infection rates and without a behavioural symptom response.
Clustering magnified the effect of appointment type. We discuss infection
control and other factors affecting appointment choice and team organisation.
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Conclusions: Distancing between clinicians can have significant effects on team
infection. Loss of clinicians to infection likely has an adverse impact on care, not modelled
here. Appointments must account for clinical necessity as well as infection control.
Interventions to reduce transmission risk can synergize, arguing for maximal distancing
and behavioural measures (e.g., PPE) consistent with safe care.
Keywords: COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2, infection control, community mental health team, computer simulation,
susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered model, personal protective equipment, clustering
INTRODUCTION
Infection Control Strategies for Community
Teams
Many countries reduced interpersonal contact to control
infection during the COVID-19 pandemic. The UK implemented
interpersonal distancing on 16March 2020 and “lockdown” on 23
March; its National Health Service (NHS) reduced non-critical
work and moved towards videoconferencing and telephone
assessments where possible (1). However, in times of “lockdown,”
some face-to-face consultations remain necessary, including
for urgent mental or physical health needs. For community-
based health services—including physical care teams, community
mental health teams (CMHTs), mental health crisis teams, and
other urgent care services—this raises the important question
of how to structure patient contacts and clinical teams to
minimise infection.
COVID-19 is a respiratory infection transmitted directly
by airborne aerosols/droplets from an infectious person and
indirectly via contaminated objects (fomites) (2). Asymptomatic
people may be infectious (2, 3). Airborne transmission is reduced
by asymptomaticity (4), physical distance, time, and personal
protective equipment (PPE) (2), and increased by symptoms
such as coughing and aerosol-generating procedures (2). Fomite
transmission is reduced by handwashing, cleaning/disinfection,
and time, which cause viral inactivation (2, 5).
Should community services bring patients to a central base
(e.g., clinic) or visit patients at home? In the early phase of the first
wave of COVID-19 in the UK (e.g., 8 April 2020), UK guidance
advised PPE only for contact with patients having suspected or
confirmed COVID-19, rather than for all patients (6). Primary
care and outpatient settings should segregate COVID-19 and
other patients in time or space, and allocate staff to one group
or the other where possible (2). If we assume that clinic settings
have appropriate infection control procedures in place, such as
physical separation and cleaning, then a key difference between
this, and home visits is exposure of the clinician to the home
environment. This additional exposure includes other household
members and fomites. Does this pose a risk of increased
transmission to the clinician and wider community? Is this
influenced by different models of service provision?
Other questions relate to clinician–clinician encounters, and
the impact of clinical activity on disease transmission to patients
and families. To what extent do clinician–clinician and clinician–
patient encounters affect spread? This may be important not only
for the infection of clinicians, with implications for healthcare
capacity, but because clinicians may be in contact with more
people than most in a time of “social distancing” and thus
might have the potential to infect a relatively large number of
patients—one aspect of concern about “super-spreading” (7).
Clinicians may also work with patients particularly vulnerable
to COVID-19.
Modelling Approach
Epidemiologists have modelled COVID-19 spread across
populations, and social measures to reduce spread given limited
critical care capacity (4). However, at the time of writing we
were unable to find assessments of the quantitative impact
of community consultation strategy or clinician-to-clinician
contacts on disease spread [via PubMed to 29 March 2020
or via enquiries on 24 March to the NHS Sustainability
and Transformation Partnership for Cambridgeshire; search
repeated 23 Oct 2020 via PubMed as “community AND covid
AND (clinician OR appointment)”]. We therefore simulated a
population of clinicians, patients, and patients’ families via agent-
based modelling (8), seeding the population with an infectious
disease with the approximate characteristics of COVID-19. We
examined spread under different conditions of interpersonal
contacts, representing alternative ways of organising community
health services for necessary appointments. We report these
simulations and make suggestions for infection control strategies
applicable to such services.
We took a broad approach because there were insufficient
high-quality data to infer reliable parameters for many aspects
of a complex model. Uncertainties include: the infectivity profile
over time; airborne transmission rates by contact type and
time; the risks of fomite (surface) transmission in different
contexts; many details of the network of patient and household
community contacts (including community mixing in rural and
urban areas, the use of public vs. private transport, and the mix of
patient residence between private homes and care facilities); the
proportion of people in patients’ households who must continue
to work; the consequences of antigen and antibody testing; the
likelihood of serious morbidity or death following infection;
etc. Therefore, we used a standard infectious disease model
and applied simple “service-level” manipulations, including
appointment type (varying the degree to which clinicians met
patients and their family directly) and whether clinicians met
each other. We tested the robustness of these effects by varying
other inputs to summarise a wide range of unknown factors,
such as the baseline and ongoing infection rates, and a form
of inter-patient association or clustering. Furthermore, clinical
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care has competing objectives: to deliver optimal healthcare, to
safeguard patients and staff from infection, to ensure the service
is robust to staff shortages, to provide continuity of care, etc. An
action that improves infection control may have other adverse
effects. We did not model a mixed objective function explicitly.
Instead, we focus on infection rates (including clinician infection




Fixed Patient and Disease-Process Parameters
We used a “susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered” (SEIR)
model (9), modified to distinguish the symptomatic and
infectious periods (Figure 1A). We modelled individuals
stochastically (appropriate for small populations). (a) Susceptible.
Every simulated person began in the “susceptible” state. (b)
Exposed. If a simulated person was exposed to someone who
was infectious at that time, they had a certain chance (described
below) of becoming infected. If infected, they entered a latent
or incubation period, during which they were not yet infectious
to others. (c) Infectiousness and symptomaticity. People became
infectious 4.6 days (the latent period) after infection (4). People
were randomly assigned to become symptomatic (if infected)
with probability p = 0.67, initially based on influenza (10)
and close to the 69% (confidence interval 46–92%) estimated
for SARS-CoV-2 (11). Otherwise, infection would lead to
asymptomatic infectiousness. (d) Duration of infectiousness and
symptomaticity, and transition to recovery. People remained
infectious for 7 days, an uncertain value based on (12, 13); we
used a simple model without temporal variation in infectivity
during that time. If symptoms developed, they began 5.1 days
after infection (4, 14, 15) and lasted 7 days (12). Recovery
precluded re-infection (also uncertain).
The transmission risk when a susceptible person was exposed
to a symptomatic infectious individual was assumed to be p =
0.2 for 24 h exposure. We reduced this proportionally for shorter
periods of exposure: a process with a constant rate of infection (or
half-life τ for remaining uninfected), e.g., pinfection(t) = 1–0.5
t/τ ,
is approximately linear in this range. This value is uncertain:
the basic reproduction number (R0) estimated for COVID-19
(16–18) implicitly incorporates the duration of infectiousness,
the interpersonal contact rate, and the transmission risk per
contact (itself depending on contact duration and transmission
risk per unit time) (19). An R0-value of 2–3 (16) would be
roughly equivalent to p = 0.2 per 24 h exposure if, for example,
an infectious person infected 0.35 people/day for 7 days (2.5
people in total), e.g., via contact with susceptible others for 40
person-hours (e.g., 10 people, 4 h each) per day. Asymptomatic
people were 50% as infectious biologically as their symptomatic
counterparts (4, 10).
These values may be biologically inaccurate, and we did not
implement realistic intersubject variability in these parameters.
More sophisticated models exist (20). However, the absolute rate
of infection was not our chief concern (as above); rather, we
focused on the effect of service arrangements (described below).
Relative differences due to service organisation were assumed
to be ordinally independent of the absolute transmission risk or
other biological parameters.
Fixed Population Parameters
We simulated encounters between clinicians, patients, and
patients’ household contacts (Figure 1B). A team of 20 clinicians
was simulated, representing a multidisciplinary team (MDT).
Each clinician saw five new patients per day, without follow-
up appointments. Every clinician–patient interaction lasted 1 h,
based on a common UK “new patient” appointment slot in
psychiatry. Patients were assumed to come from independent
households. Patients could live with others (referred to here as
family); the number of family members per patient was drawn
from a Poisson distribution with λ = 1.37, from the mean UK
household size of 2.37 (21). Everyone in a household was assumed
to interact daily and every household contact was assumed to
last 8 h/day. Clinicians’ households were not simulated, for
simplicity (though the likely effect of adding clinician households
would be to increase clinician infection rates slightly). People
were assumed to follow household social isolation, i.e., with
the exception of clinician encounters, there were no explicit
household–household contacts. In addition, “external” infection
was simulated (see below).
If a clinician became symptomatic, they were assumed to cease
work for the duration of their symptoms and not meet others in
the model during that time. Their appointments were reassigned
to other clinicians (who therefore saw more patients, without
limit). Symptomatic patients and family continued to interact
with each other, and symptomatic patients were assumed still to
require clinical care.
We simulated a population of mean size 14,240 (20 clinicians,
6,000 patients, and on average 8,220 family members) for
60 consecutive days (1–60, with no allowance for weekends).
Days were simulated discretely; i.e., contacts were simulated
(effectively) simultaneously for a given day, without regard to
time of day.
Manipulations
The following aspects were varied, in all possible combinations.
Variable ranges were chosen to represent plausible extremes.
• Appointment type (“AT”). In the “patient only” (PO)
condition, clinicians interacted only with the patient. This
was intended to represent patients coming alone to a clinic,
not interacting with others, with physical distancing, and
decontamination of clinic environments. In the “family
contact” (FC) condition, clinicians also interacted for 0.2 h
(12min) with each family member of the patient. This was
intended to represent a home visit, but might also represent
family accompanying the patient to a clinic and being present
for a collateral history. In the “remote visit” (RV, e.g.,
videoconferencing) condition, no direct clinician–patient, or
clinician–family contact occurred.
• Clinician–clinician meetings (“CM”). In the “clinician
meeting” condition, all clinicians met up for 1 h/day (e.g., for
a handover or MDT meeting). In the “no clinician meeting”
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of simulation methods. (A) Individual people followed a “susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered” model, with full immunity after recovery.
Whether an infected person developed symptoms or not was probabilistic (see Methods) and if they developed symptoms, this occurred slightly after the infectious
period began. (B) Interaction between people (see Methods). Solid lines show fixed interactions; dashed lines show interactions that were varied. Patients interacted
with their household (family) members and family members interacted with each other. Family sizes varied. In different conditions, clinicians did or did not interact
directly with each other. Clinicians interacted with their patients, except in the “remote visit” condition. In the “family contact” (e.g., home visit) condition, clinicians also
interacted briefly with family (not all such interactions drawn). The initial level of infection and the rate of ongoing “external” infection (red arrows) were varied. Additional
manipulations, not shown here, included whether symptoms altered infectiousness in a behavioural, protective way (in contrast to an ever-present biological
exacerbating way) and, in Experiment 2, whether patient households were grouped together in larger clusters with mutual interaction.
condition, clinicians did not interact with each other in person
(e.g., used videoconferencing instead).
• Baseline infection rate (“BL”). On day 0, the day before
interpersonal contact simulation began, either 1 or 5% of the
population were infected at random, reflecting approximate
confidence interval (CI) extremes for the UK, 28 March
2020 (22). Clinicians and others had an equal chance of
initial infection.
• External infection (“EX”). Every person had a 0, 0.5, 1, or 2%
chance each day of becoming infected from external sources
(e.g., in supermarkets, on public transport, etc.). The external
infection rate is not constant in an epidemic, being affected
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by prevalence and the rate of external contacts; the upper
figure of 2% was chosen to represent a very high value (e.g.,
if 10% of “external” people were infectious and each modelled
person had 24 person-hours of “external” contact per day at
transmission risk p= 0.2 per person-day exposure as above).
• Protective behavioural effect of symptoms upon
transmission risk (“SX”). Being symptomatic has biological
consequences (modelled above) but also social consequences.
For example, overt illness may increase physical distancing
or cause clinicians to use PPE, reducing infection risks. We
chose values to represent plausible extremes of any such effect.
In one condition, being symptomatic had an effect to reduce
transmission risk to 10% of what it would otherwise have been
(“behavioural symptom effect present”); the relative risk of
infection with H7N7 avian influenza A is ∼9% when using
a respirator (23). Alternatively, the transmission risk was
unmodified (“behavioural symptom effect absent”). If present,
this effect applied to all interpersonal contacts (which may
be unrealistic in that family members are unlikely to use PPE
with each other; thus, any such behavioural effects may be
smaller than those modelled).
Simulation
We simulated each condition 2,000 times, using Python (https://
www.python.org/).
Analysis
We used R (https://www.r-project.org/) to analyse the total
number of (a) people and (b) clinicians infected by the end
of the virtual experiment. We used a generalised linear model
(GLM) with a Poisson distribution and a log link function, then
analysis of deviance with type III sums of squares and α =
0.05. However, the statistical power of a simulation is arbitrary
(being determined by the effect size and the number of runs);
thus, we present CIs and do not report exact p-values, reporting
instead “p < α” for 10−3 ≤ p < 0.05; “p ≪ α” for 10−5 ≤ p
< 10−3; “p ≪ α” for p < 10−5. A significant interaction term
implies non-additive effects of factors on the linear predictor, but
because the predictors were on a log scale with respect to the
dependent variable, interactions imply non-multiplicative effects
of experimental factors on the number of people infected.
Experiment 2
Not all patients live in small households: some live in much
larger shared living facilities, such as care homes. Clustering
might be used as a route out of “lockdown.” Does such patient
clustering amplify any infection-transmitting effect of clinicians,
who are unusually mobile people during times of “lockdown”
and may travel between clusters? We examined whether the
effects of appointment type and clinician meetings depended
on the degree of patient clustering in such “hubs,” which we
modelled as large households with multiple patients and their
virtual “families” (or, similarly, care staff). We implemented this
simply, by aggregating virtual households: thus, n = 1 patients
plus their family (household) per cluster as in Experiment
1, or n = 2 households per cluster, etc. For simplicity, all
co-residents were assumed to interact with each other, as
patients and family would in a single-patient household, and
clinicians were assumed to have “family-level” contact with
everyone else in the cluster during FC-type visits. The selection
of patients requiring a visit on any 1 day was random;
those patients were then assigned cyclically to available (not
sick) clinicians.
We varied the number of patients per household (“NPH,”
1–10, as a discrete predictor), AT, and CM. We held all other
parameters constant at values suggested by Experiment 1 to give
high power to detect such effects (no behavioural symptom effect;
BL 1%; EX 0%).
Deterministic SEIR Model
To examine the basis of the synergy between interventions
observed in Experiments 1–2, we ran deterministic plain SEIR
models using the EpiDynamics R package. This form of model
represents SEIR state changes via differential equations governed
by rate parameters. Solutions to a system of differential equations
are deterministic and represent the expected consequences, in
the limit, of a large number of stochastic events. The SEIR
model assumes that (a) subjects move from the susceptible (S)
state to the exposed-but-not-yet-infectious (E) state in a manner
governed by the number of infectious (I) people present and
a transmission rate parameter β (representing a combination
of the degree of interpersonal contact and the biological
infectivity); (b) subjects move from the E (exposed/incubation
period) state to the infectious (I) state according to a further
rate parameter, σ ; and (c) that people move from the I
state to the recovered (R) state according to a recovery rate
parameter, γ . Recovered people are assumed to be immune
and therefore not susceptible to further infection. SEIR models
may also add new people to the model (“birth”) or remove
them via death (not used in the present experiment). This
simple deterministic model does not consider the timing,
symptom, or interpersonal contact structure used in our agent-
based model. We varied the proportion exposed at time t
= 0 (1 or 5%, cf. Experiment 1) and the transmission rate
β . Constants were: tfinal = 1,000 (for asymptote); birth/death
rate µ = 0; exposed-to-infectious rate σ = 1/5; recovery
rate γ = 1/7. We examined the cumulative proportion
infected (1–susceptible).
Patient and Public Involvement
Several of the authors have self-isolated as patients during the
pandemic. Patients were not otherwise involved.
RESULTS
Whole-Population Infection Rates
In Experiment 1, whole-population infection was dominated by
baseline and external infection rates (with infection spreading
primarily via intra-household contacts), plus the behavioural
response to symptoms (all p ≪ α), with only very small
contributions from the appointment type and clinician–clinician
meetings (Figure 2A). That is, neither appointment type nor
clinician meetings had any appreciable effect on the total number
of people infected. Appointment type and clinician meetings had
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Appointment type and clinician–clinician meetings had no substantial effect on whole-population infection. A protective behavioural response to
symptoms had a proportionally greater effect at lower external infection rates. (B) Appointment type and clinician meetings had more substantial effects on the
infection of clinicians. Moving to lower-contact appointment types and reducing clinician meetings showed synergy with a protective behavioural response to
symptoms. (C) Clustering patient households together increased whole-population transmission. (D) Clustering increased clinician infection and substantially
magnified the effect of appointment type. The beneficial effect of eliminating face-to-face clinician–clinician meetings was proportionally greater in low-clustering
conditions, but this effect was very small. “Cluster size” refers to the number of patients (and their virtual families, or care home staff) per interacting “household”. (E)
Changes in transmission rate have non-linear effects on the total proportion of the population infected, shown in a deterministic standard SEIR model (solid line, 1%
initially exposed; dotted line, 5% initially exposed). This effect underlies the synergy between measures that can be taken to reduce the transmission of infection: small
changes in transmission risk sometimes cause dramatic changes in total infection. [RV, remote visits; PO, patient only; FC, family contact. Logarithmic scale. Error
bars/ribbons are 95% CIs. “Behav. Sx effect” refers to the behavioural effect upon transmission when an infected person shows symptoms; either this reduces the
transmission risk to 10% of its former value, e.g., via enhanced physical distancing or PPE, or has no effect].
effects (e.g., AT × CM × BL × EX × SX interaction, p < α),
but these effects were very small (the overall difference in the
proportion infected was 0.01 percentage points between FC and
RV conditions; Figure 2A). The beneficial effects of symptom-
induced protective behaviour were proportionally greater in
conditions with lower external infection rates (BL × EX × SX,
p≪ α; Figure 2A).
Effects of Appointment Type on Clinician
Infection
In contrast, appointment type had more substantial effects on
clinician infection rates (Figure 2B), which depended upon
external infection rates and the behavioural symptom effect (AT,
p ≪ α; AT × EX × SX, p ≪ α). As expected from the
number of contacts involved, infection rates were consistently
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ranked “family contact” (e.g., home visit)>“patient only” (e.g.,
clinic)>“remote” for all conditions. However, these effects were
lessened at high external infection rates. We calculated the “new
infection” rate as the final number of clinicians infected minus
the number infected on day 0. We examined new infections in
the PO condition as a proportion of the FC condition (PO new
infections ÷ FC new infections) and similarly for RV vs. FC.
With 0% external infection, appointment type had a substantial
effect (PO 82% of FC; RV 22% of FC); with 2% external infection,
this was much less (PO 99% of FC, RV 95%). The effects of
appointment type were larger without a behavioural symptom
effect (Figure 2B).
Effects of Clinician–Clinician Meetings on
Clinician Infection
There was a strong effect of clinician meetings, more pronounced
at low levels of external infection (Figure 2B; CM, p ≪ α;
CM × EX, p ≪ α). We calculated the effect’s magnitude as
“new infections without clinician meetings ÷ new infections
with clinician meetings” (“new infections” defined as before).
The effect of eliminating clinician meetings was much larger
with external infection at 0% (RV 0%, PO 36%, and FC 38%)
than at 2% (RV 94%, PO 95%, and FC 95%), and numerically
larger with a behavioural symptom effect [e.g., for 0% EX and PO
appointments, eliminating clinician meetings cut new infections
to 25% (of that with meetings) when there was a behavioural
symptom effect, but only to 47% without that behavioural effect].
Effects of Symptom-Related Behaviour on
Clinician Infection
Symptom-triggered behaviour had substantial effects on clinician
infection rates (Figures 2A,B; SX, p ≪ α; AT × EX × SX, p ≪
α), as it did for whole-population rates. The beneficial effects of
symptom-triggered behaviour were proportionally greater with
lower external infection rates, for higher-risk appointment types,
and without clinician meetings.
Impact of Patient Clustering
Figures 2C,D shows Experiment 2’s results. Predictably, greater
clustering increased infection rates (whole-population and
clinicians, NPH, p ≪ α). The effects of appointment type and
clinician meetings on whole-population infection (AT × CM ×
NPH, p ≪ α) were very small. The effects of appointment type
on clinician infection were substantially magnified by greater
clustering (AT× NPH, p≪ α).
Synergy Between Service Manipulations
Many of the effects of the modelled variables upon clinician
infections were synergistic. Preventing physical clinician
meetings had a greater proportional effect when external
infection rates were lower, and with a behavioural protective
response to symptoms (as above). Moving to lower-contact
appointment types had a greater proportional effect when
external infection rates were lower. Not all manipulations were
synergistic (e.g., appointment types had a greater proportional
effect without a behavioural response to symptoms, but
both manipulations were nonetheless helpful). In a simple
deterministic SEIR model, linear changes in transmission
rate had non-linear effects on the cumulative infection rate




We modelled a hypothetical community clinical team, under
different baseline and external infection rates. The fictional team
organised its patient assessments in controlled environments in
which only clinician–patient contacts occurred (e.g., managed
clinics), visits in which some clinician–family contacts occurred
(e.g., home visits or family present for a collateral history), or
remote assessments in which the clinician and patient did not
meet physically (e.g., videoconferencing). Clinicians met daily
in person, or refrained from doing so. Under our assumptions,
these service arrangements had only a very small impact on
infection rates across the population studied (clinicians, patients,
and family together; Figures 2A,C), but some had a substantial
effect on clinician infection rates (Figures 2B,D). Clinicians may
sometimes be a scarce resource, so higher clinician infection
rates may have wider adverse effects on population health
through lack of clinician availability. Behavioural measures
to reduce transmission in response to overt symptoms also
had substantial effects on infection rates, despite a period
of “silent” infectiousness and some infectious people never
exhibiting symptoms.
In our model, the infection risk to clinicians of appointment
type directly reflected the degree of contacts with patients and
family. This was expected, but we have quantified the relative
importance of structural servicemanipulations. Eliminating daily
face-to-face clinician–clinician meetings also had a noticeable
effect on clinician infection rates, which was most pronounced,
proportionally, with the lowest-risk patient encounter types.
Combined risk reduction methods interacted with each other,
sometimes having more than a multiplicative effect, and were
disproportionately more effective than each alone. All these
effects lessened with increasing rates of infection from outside the
modelled population. The impact of clinical service organisation
on whole-population infection was small likely because the
maximum possible number of contact hours between clinicians
and patients in our model was realistically small relative
to those for patient–family interactions. Patient clustering
increased whole-population infection and magnified the effect
of appointment type on clinician infection, even for “patient-
only” appointments. In our model, it was possible for multiple
clinicians to visit a cluster; restricting which clinicians visit
which clusters may be another important factor to consider.
Clustering or “hub” effects may also occur in other ways not
modelled here—such as patients being in receipt of multiple
services from one or several provider organisations—and would
similarly serve to increase transmission further. Changes in
“lockdown” practices may affect external infection rates or
clustering, requiring services to adapt to changing public health
policy. Multiple small improvements in infection control can
have a total effect greater than the sum of its parts (Figure 2E).
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TABLE 1 | Infection control and clinical factors to consider for home visits, clinic appointments, and videoconferencing.
Home visits Clinic appointments Videoconferencing
Infection
control
Positive ◮ Patients remain at home and are
not exposed to travel or to other
patients or the public
◮ Able in principle to control environment,
including distance between clinicians and
patients, handwashing facilities, etc.
◮ Able to limit number: no relatives present (not
always possible, as below)
◮ Very unwell and chaotic patients may not abide
by “rules” of interpersonal space, reducing the
infection control benefits
◮ May be easier and safer to complete
assessment with a single clinician in a single visit,
reducing contacts
◮ Eliminates person-to-person contact
for the attendees
Negative ◮ Possible increased number of
household contacts with staff
(family members etc.)
◮ Potential for limited handwashing
facilities compared to clinics
◮ Possible fomite transmission via
contamination of environment (not
known, not controllable)
◮ Patients have to travel to clinic, possibly on
public transport or via ambulance, or with an
escort, increasing exposure
◮ Patients are brought from the community to a
clinical space, perhaps near to hospital inpatient
sites, with risk of contact with other patients,
staff members, etc.
◮ Some (e.g., single parents with multiple children)
might have to bring one or more others
◮ There is a particular need to consider the needs
of high-risk/vulnerable patients including those
who may be especially anxious about
leaving home
◮ Without appropriate cleaning, the




Positive ◮ Increased engagement with the
most severely unwell patients
◮ Sometimes the only option (e.g.,
patients who are not engaging,
assessments under the Mental
Health Act or equivalent
legislation, etc.)
◮ Increased clinical understanding of
patient based on their
surroundings can be invaluable,
particularly with the most unwell or
vulnerable
◮ Input from carers and family
is enhanced
◮ Significantly less travel time for staff (compared
to home visits) increases efficiency at a time of
significant staffing concerns
◮ A safe and calm environment that may aid
assessment for some patients
◮ Access for staff to supportive colleagues (but
note the benefits of physical distancing)
◮ May increase clinician efficiency
compared to clinic appointments (e.g.,
reduced time between appointments;
potential for automatic transcription via
voice recognition)
◮ May be seen by some patients as
a desirable balance of interpersonal
interaction and infection control
◮ Carer/family communication possible as
for home visits
◮ Colleague support as for clinic visits
Negative ◮ Less easy to ensure safety of staff
◮ Home visits add travel time for
clinicians, decreasing efficiency
◮ Some homes are difficult to
assess a patient in
◮ If there are safeguarding concerns
it is sometimes hard for a child or
vulnerable adult to speak freely
at home
◮ It may be distressing or even at times unsafe to
ask very unwell patients to travel (perhaps very
long distances)
◮ It represents a change in established patterns of
working for some services
◮ Risk of losing engagement with some high-risk
patient groups
◮ May be inferior to assessment in person
in terms of nuance, body language,
situational awareness, and rapport
◮ May be impossible for some patients,
particularly those who are severely
unwell
◮ Relies on computing infrastructure
(clinician’s, patient’s, intervening
networks) which may fail
◮ May be unfamiliar, reducing efficiency
◮ Safeguarding concerns as for
home visits
Implications
These results emphasise and quantify an obvious point that
minimising contact with additional people, such as household
contacts of a patient, contributes to infection control. Family
contacts might occur during a home visit, but also if family
accompany patients to a clinic. Videoconferencing or other
remote assessment obviously provides the best infection control
of the methods modelled here. However, there are trade-
offs between infection control and clinical care for different
appointment types, which must be judged by individual teams
and clinicians. In particular, the choice between home visits
and clinic assessments is complex and goes beyond the “family
contact” aspects modelled here (Table 1). Other infection control
differences include exposure to others during transport (likely
favouring home visits by clinicians), and the risk of fomite
transmission in either environment (hard to quantify, but
potentially less predictable and greater for home visits). Relevant
clinical differences go beyond infection control (Table 1), and
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TABLE 2 | Some behavioural infection control strategies for clinical teams.
Reducing airborne transmission Reducing fomite transmission
All interpersonal contact ◮ Standard national precautions (including physical
distancing and appropriate PPE)




◮ Remote communication (e.g., phone,
videoconferencing)
◮ For interpersonal contact, split into subteams,
and avoid mixing subteams. (Example: 1 team of
20 clinicians can have 20C2 = 190 pairwise
contacts. Four subteams of five can have 4 ×
5C2 = 40 contacts)
◮ Minimise the number of staff “on site” at any one
time (24)
◮ Remote communication
◮ Subteams and staff minimisation as for airborne
◮ Uniform/scrubs worn only at work, removed, and laundered at day’s
end
◮ One-way flow of clinicians from “clean to dirty” (25) across a day
where patients must be seen in person (e.g., confirmed negative →
not suspected → suspected → confirmed COVID-19). Areas at
clinicians’ base also segregated by “cleanliness.” Once progressed,
clinicians have no contact with those in a “cleaner” category.
Environmental cleaning regularly and at day’s end
Clinician–patient interactions ◮ Remote assessment (e.g., videoconferencing)
where possible
◮ Remote assessment where possible
◮ “Clean to dirty” progression as above
These are not exhaustive and are not intended to supplant local or national guidance.
appointment types should be tailored to the clinical situation;
for example, face-to-face contact is more likely to be required
for patients with higher-risk mental states, if there are particular
safeguarding concerns, and for first contacts (vs. follow-up
appointments) (Table 1).
A striking result was the degree to which clinician–
clinician meetings affected clinician infection rates, in some
cases synergistically with other infection control measures.
UK guidelines in wave 1 of COVID-19 (2) included patient
segregation, and segregation of primary care staff for COVID-
19 and other patients, but did not recommend the segregation of
all clinical staff, or all staff, from each other as far as is possible.
Reducing contact between staff may be practical. Dividing
a clinical team into subteams may provide partial benefits
(Table 2). Fomite transmission is also a risk to clinical teams,
though this risk may have been overestimated (26): precautions
available to clinical teams against fomite transmission overlap
with but have some distinct elements from those for airborne
transmission (Table 2).
Study Limitations
The biological parameters we took for COVID-19 spread
were estimates from the published literature in the first half
of 2020 and in some cases are subject to high uncertainty;
likewise our estimates of initial and ongoing infection rates.
Disease parameters were constant across subjects, other than
symptomaticity given infection, which was stochastic. A paucity
of contacts outside the household is highly atypical but
corresponds to current UK policy, if not necessarily universal
practice. The behavioural effect of symptoms upon transmission
risk was modelled in the same way for household contacts as for
clinician–patient contacts, which is unrealistic in that clinicians
are more likely to have access to PPE and rules mandating its
use. Clinicians’ households were not modelled and would tend
to increase clinician infection rates (particularly if clinicians
share a household). We also modelled a series of one-off patient
assessments; many patients, of course, are seen repeatedly by their
clinical teams, or see many different healthcare teams routinely.
However, while any of these aspects might limit generalisability,
all were constant across conditions.
Similarly, the classes of models used carry limitations. For
example, both the stochastic and deterministic SEIR models
assume that infection/recovery precludes subsequent reinfection.
Reinfection with SARS-CoV-2 is uncommon but possible (27).
Similarly, the stochastic model assumed fixed times (e.g., for
incubation/latency) and probabilities (e.g., of transmission or
of becoming symptomatic), while the deterministic SEIR model
assumes constant state transition rates. In the real world, such
quantities are not fixed; for example, some individuals may
transmit infection at higher rates than others, for example by
being highly mobile within a population (“superspreading”)
(28). Real-world transmission dynamics may bring further
non-linearity. While such considerations may again limit
generalisability of our findings, they do not prevent comparison
across simulated conditions as in the present study.
More important for the present study are limitations relating
to differences between conditions. In the “family contact”
(e.g., home visit) condition, we made assumptions about the
duration of contact with family members, including that this
plausibly encompassed the degree of surface as well as airborne
transmission, and we assumed clinicians were not fomite vectors
for direct transfer of virus between homes. In the “patient only”
(e.g., clinic) condition, we assumed full segregation and cleaning
between patients, with no inter-patient virus transfer. In the
“no clinicians meeting” condition, we assumed a lack of fomite
transmission between clinicians. Any of these may be unrealistic,
limiting generalisability. Fomite transmission in either situation
would likely increase infection rates and alter the impact of
appointment type upon infection.Wemake our source code open
for others to test different assumptions.
Conclusions
Staff segregation, as well as appointment type and additional
protective measures when meeting overtly symptomatic
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 9 February 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 620842
Cardinal et al. COVID-19 Mental Health Team Simulation
people, may have important effects on COVID-19
transmission in community clinical teams. Infection control
manipulations can synergize with each other, suggesting
that maximal implementation of such measures should be
adopted to the degree possible. Appointment types must
nevertheless meet the clinical need as well as infection
control guidelines.
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